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Abstract
As the largest e-commerce platform, Taobao helps advertis-
ers reach billions of search queries each day via sponsored
search, which has also contributed considerable revenue to
the platform. An efficient bidding strategy to cater to di-
verse advertiser demands while balancing platform revenue
and consumer experience is significant to a healthy and sus-
tainable marketing ecosystem. In this paper we propose Cus-
tomer Intelligent Agent (CIA), a bidding optimization frame-
work which implements an impression-level bidding to re-
flect advertisers’ conversion willingness and budget control.
In this way, CIA is capable of fulfilling various e-commerce
advertiser demands on different levels, such as Gross Mer-
chandise Volume optimization, style comparison etc. Addi-
tionally, a replay based simulation system is designed to pre-
dict the performance of different take-rate. CIA unifies the
benefits of three parties in the marketing ecosystem without
changing the Generalized Second Price mechanism. Our ex-
tensive offline simulations and large-scale online experiments
on Taobao Search Advertising (TSA) platform verify the high
effectiveness of the CIA framework. Moreover, CIA has been
deployed online as a major bidding tool in TSA.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search has provided considerable revenue for uni-
versal search engines such as Google, Bing and vertical
e-commerce websites like Taobao and Amazon. The 2017
Tmall Double Eleven shopping festival sees total sales of
25.4 billion (Reuters 2017), showing the prosperity of online
shopping and associated advertising market. As the biggest
e-commerce platform in China (Edquid 2017), more than
300 million consumers in Taobao reach commodities via
keyword search each day, bringing daily 10 billion search
queries and subsequent page views (PVs). Suchmassive PVs
provide advertisers (mainly Taobao sellers) sufficient oppor-
tunities to expose their commodities and services.
Taobao Search Advertising (TSA) is a suite of commer-
cial advertising service 1. Each advertiser maintains a tree-
like TSA account as shown in Fig. 1. The account has a
balance and consists of several budget-limited marketing
campaigns, while a campaign accommodates a set of ADs
2 to be promoted. At the most fine-grained level, each AD
1http://zhitongche.taobao.com
2In TSA, an advertising commodity or service is called an AD.
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Figure 1: Advertiser TSA account architecture.
specifies multiple relevant keywords and sets a fixed bid on
each of them to compete for impressions. Search queries
initiated by consumers retrieve relevant ADs through ex-
act or broad keyword matching. Generally, all the ADs are
ranked by the product of bid and predicted Click Through
Rate (CTR). Once clicked, they will be charged the min-
imal price to maintain their position (Generalized Second
Price, GSP), to maximize the expected revenue of the plat-
form (King, Atkins, and Schwarz 2007). Cumulative post-
click behaviors such as adding to collections/shopping carts
and making purchases are used as ranking signals in future
organic search, in which way TSA is especially useful for
the cold start of new arrivals and earning persistent revenue.
Apart from keyword selection, advertisers can optimize
their marketing demands in TSA by way of cautiously de-
termining strategic bids. Nevertheless, such optimization is
intractable due to the shortage of auction competition in-
formation, computation, and storage capacity. On the con-
trary, the advertising platform is omniscient and amenable to
help advertisers bid for a healthy marketing ecology. How-
ever, if the platform takes the duty to design a bidding strat-
egy for advertisers, new challenges might appear. Firstly,
under the Pay Per Click (PPC) pricing mechanism, a mis-
match of profits naturally arises between the platform’s im-
mediate revenue and advertiser’s Gross Merchandise Vol-
ume (GMV), i.e., the platform charges the click while most
advertisers bid for the conversion/purchase. Secondly, any
bidding strategy designed by the platform is inevitable to
be faced with the multi-agent problem, i.e., an uncertain
amount of heterogeneous advertisers might opt in proxy bid-
ding, which makes the strategy difficult to optimize. Last
but not least, millions of varied-sized advertisers hosted
by TSA have quite different marketing demands, showing
diverse preferences in impression-level bidding. Existing
work mostly falls into the maximization of a single adver-
tiser’s profit in display advertising by the Demand Side Plat-
forms (DSPs, e.g., iPinYou (Ren et al. 2017; Cai et al. 2017;
Zhang, Yuan, and Wang 2014), JD (Wang et al. 2017), and
Media6Degrees (Claudia et al. 2012)), and are not moti-
vated to take platform revenue and consumer experience into
account, which is critical for an advertising platform.
In this paper, we cater to various advertiser demands with
a unified impression-level bidding based demand optimiza-
tion framework called Customer Intelligent Agent (CIA).
CIA keeps advertisers’ knobs on keyword-level bids to con-
vey varied-level Return-On-Investment (ROI) expectations.
Meanwhile, the impression-level bid is applied considering
both real-time AD-query features and advertisers’ demand-
specific ROI preferences. Combined with CTR and CVR
(Conversion Rate) prediction modules (Gai et al. 2017),
CIA balances the benefits of three parties without chang-
ing the original auction mechanism. A replay based simu-
lation system takes the historical auction in to evaluate the
winning probability and daily performance of different bids
as the optimization tool. Offline simulations and online A/B
test show that it outperforms optimized fixed keyword-level
bids for various demands fulfilling. CIA based GMV opti-
mization and style comparison have been widely adopted by
advertisers 3 in the TSA platform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we give a more detailed analysis of related work on bidding
optimization. The architecture of CIA is given in Section
3 where we formulate the optimization problems with their
constraints. Section 4 discusses the influence of CIA bidding
in the GSP mechanism. And we give a replay based imple-
mentation of CIA in Section 5. In Section 6 we report some
simulation and experimental results illustrating the perfor-
mance of CIA on the TSA system. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Related work
Most existing bidding strategies designed by
DSPs aim to optimize only one single adver-
tiser’s profits by assuming that the competitive
environment is stationary (Diemert et al. 2017;
Ren et al. 2017; Zhang, Yuan, and Wang 2014;
Claudia et al. 2012). In the case of unconstrained bud-
get, truthful bidding in GSP has proved to achieve the
Nash-Equilibrium for a single item auction (Krishna 2009).
In (Zhang, Yuan, and Wang 2014), Zhang et al. studied
the optimal bidding in display advertising with budget
constraints on sequential bids, with the expected number
of clicks maximized. Relying on independent CTR and bid
landscape prediction modules, the authors proved that con-
cave bidders paying more attention to low CTR impressions
might be better. Later, if the budget was directly on the
charging price, Zhang et al. proved that linear bidding is
3More than 50% of all the ADs switched to CIA bidding, con-
tributing over 30% of the daily revenue according to the statistics
in Feb. 2018.
optimal (Ren et al. 2017) and a joint optimization including
CTR estimation, market price prediction and bidding
were applied. However, all these methods consider only a
single advertiser’s profits. Moreover, a reasonable budget
constraint is usually not directly available in TSA practice.
Other novel work also exists in display advertising.
Considering the sequential decision processes in impres-
sion bidding, Cai et al. utilized reinforcement learning
to bid (Cai et al. 2017). With the assumption of i.i.d im-
pression features, they derived an optimal real-time bid-
der under budget and auction volume constraints. A sim-
ilar idea was also used in JD DSP business, with deep
Q-learner in its bidder(Wang et al. 2017). Reinforcement
learning is a straightforward solution to the scenario of de-
layed rewards in online advertising. Diemert et al. improved
single-impression bidder by attributing post-impression ac-
tions into previous bids to decouple the sequential bid-
ding process (Diemert et al. 2017). Another related line of
bidding optimization research lies in smart pacing, which
helps budget-limited advertisers decide whether to bid or
an impression or not (Karande, Mehta, and Srikant 2013;
Lee, Jalali, and Dasdan 2013).
In sponsored search, the work on joint optimization of
keyword-level bids and budget allocation over a campaign
(several campaigns shared a budget) (Zhang et al. 2012) re-
sembles our scenario. More keyword-level sponsored search
bidding work can be found in (Qin, Chen, and Liu 2015).
However, keyword-level bidding does not distinguish im-
pressions from the same query. Such coarse-grained bid-
ding is incapable of serving advertisers in an optimal way
or meeting the ROI constraints well.
3 CIA Framework in Taobao Sponsored
Search
Marketing demands at TSA can be classified into two cat-
egories, i.e., basic and compound demands. Basic demands
include acquisitions of impressions, clicks and conversions,
which are ubiquitous in online advertising. Particularly, for
e-commerce platforms like Taobao, compound demands are
more platform-specific, which cover the complete market-
ing cycle of an AD. Detailed demands and their Key-
Performance-Indicators (KPIs) are summarized in Tab. 1.
Table 1: Various advertiser demands and KPIs in TSA
Demands Description KPI
Basic
Impression Number of impressions
Click Number of clicks
Conversion Collections/Shopping carts/GMV
Compound
Style comparison Fast comparison of different styles under a budget
Audience expansion GMV from new consumers
Price-off promotions Fast clearance with an acceptable ROI
Fig. 2 illustrates how CIA framework works within the
TSA system. Advertisers express their marketing demands
on different ADs via keyword-level bids or direct AD-level
take-rate (abbreviated as tk) and CIA optimizes impression-
level bids respecting the demands. Optimizer balances the
take-rate and advertising costs. A replay based simulation
system is utilized to obtain the solution. CTR/CVR predic-
tion models are also necessary to characterize an impression
but will not be elaborated in detail as they are not the key
contributions of our work. All the competitive ADs and their
contextual information in an auction are recorded in logs for
the replay system.
Advertisers’ demands are optimized under CIA in equa-
tion (1). Regardless of various demands, a reasonable bud-
get constraint is necessary. Additionally, advertisers also
bid with the expectation of conversions (adding to collec-
tions/shopping carts/purchase) in e-commerce. Each dollar
spent should account for some returns, only high or low for
different demands. Therefore, demand optimization should
also take unit conversion cost (aka tk) as a constraint.
max
bid
KPI
s.t. budget constraint,
unit conversion cost constraint.
(1)
While optimization objectives are exactly demonstrated in
Tab. 1, the constraints, despite roughly depicted above, are
still challenging to be specified. Firstly, budget constraints
are set only at the campaign level in TSA, while AD-level
tk to regulate impression-level bidding requires a reasonable
AD-level budget. Secondly, advertisers prefer to use fixed
keyword-level bids instead of tk to express their expected
unit conversion cost due to business secrets or inaccurate
CTR predictions. To sum up, we have to infer reasonable
tk and also budget from keyword-level bid settings. We will
elaborate on the inference in the following section.
3.1 Bridging keyword-level bid settings and
constraints
Generally, advertisers choose the keywords of an AD and set
fixed bids. Given m auctions (j = 1, ...,m) which involves
the AD, the accumulated ROI can be calculated as:
R =
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗ cvrj ∗ ipj
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗ cj
≈
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗ cvrj ∗ ipj
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗ bj
, (2)
where cj is the click cost and can be approximated with the
corresponding keyword bid bj to obtain a lower bound of
ROI while ip stands for the item price. Following the above
formula, we actually obtain an expected ROI from the origi-
nal bid settings and auction log. Implicitly, this ROI reflects
the advertiser’s implicit rationality in the marketing environ-
ment.
Meanwhile, it is sufficient to guarantee the cumulative
ROI if each advertiser bids with an acceptable ROI in each
auction. An impression-level roi satisfies that,
roi =
ctr ∗ cvr ∗ ip
ctr ∗ c
, (3)
where c is the cost upon clicking. Let roi ≥ R, then c ≤
cvr∗ip
R
. In GSP it usually satisfies that c ≤ bid, therefore it
is sufficient to bid as,
bid = tk ∗ cvr ∗ ip, tk =
1
R
. (4)
Furthermore, the advertiser’s changing keyword-level bids
can easily propagate to tk given the historical auction log.
∆tk ≈
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗∆bj
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗ cvrj ∗ ipj
, (5)
where ∆(·) corresponds to the perturbations on its input ar-
gument.
In the above analysis, we take the auction log of an AD,
arriving an AD-level tk. Campaign/keyword-level tks can
be derived likewise with corresponding logs. tk can be up-
dated daily with historical auction logs or in an online way
from real-time auctions. In the latter way, real-time changes
in advertisers’ keyword-level bid settings and auction dis-
tribution can be easily captured. In this paper, we take the
AD-level tk for the daily distribution of an AD’s auctions
is relatively stationary (which will be justified in Section 5),
and also for its high-interpretability to advertisers.
Relying on the historical auction log, a reasonable AD-
level virtual budget can also be obtained as:
B =
m∑
j=1
ctrj ∗ bj. (6)
If the marketing environment is stationary across days, we
believe that such a budget shall be fair and sufficient for the
advertiser. In this way, we do not need to explicitly split the
campaign budget into each AD.
To optimize various campaign-level demands, CIA intro-
duces an additional cost regulation factor α to adjust AD-
level tk in a campaign, leading to a generalized bidding for-
mula:
bid = α ∗ tk ∗ cvr ∗ ip. (7)
Generally, an α in the range of (0, 1] can roughly guar-
antee that the advertiser will gain a higher ROI than pre-
vious keyword-level bidding. However, for the approxima-
tions used, the de facto effective α might be larger than 1.
Additionally, different demands might lead to a quite differ-
ent feasible range of α. For each AD in a campaign, query
distribution is quite different from each other but shares a
common budget. For various demands, this leaves us space
to optimize different objectives by regulating AD-level α.
3.2 Demands optimization
An AD-level tk simplifies advertisers’ bidding control.
Meanwhile, campaign-level demand is the most natural way
for advertisers to manage. To this end, in this section we
tackle the two most representative demands of advertisers,
i.e., campaign-level GMV (conversion) optimization and
style comparison by regulating AD-level tk (aka, α) to il-
lustrate the whole optimization process of CIA framework.
In the following formulation, for a campaign with n ADs
(indexed by i = 1, ...n), we denote the expected daily GMV
and cost of ADs if bidding with CIA as y, z ∈ Rn. Under
the same auction environment, corresponding keyword-level
bids will lead to a cost of z˜. And the cost regulation vec-
tor is denoted as α ∈ Rn+. Beyond standard keyword-level
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Figure 2: Typical query processing procedure via CIA within TSA.
.
bids, advertiser’s bids of the n ADs lies in the range of [l,u],
l,u ∈ R+
n. 1 represents the n-dimensional column vector
with all its elements to be one. αi is the cost regulation factor
of the tk for the i-th AD. The same subscript logic applies to
y and z. xT denotes the transpose of x. ||·||2 is the Euclidean
norm of the input argument.
Advertiser campaign GMV optimization Campaign-
level GMV optimization is fundamental for advertisers in
TSA. For a campaign, we want to determine each AD’s αi
so that GMV is maximized. For a campaign-level GMV, the
problem can be formulated as:
max
α
1Ty
s.t. (β − ǫ)1T z˜ ≤ 1T z ≤ (β + ǫ)1T z˜,
β ∈ (0, 1], ǫ ∈ [0, β),
(8)
where β is the cost regulation parameter and ǫ is the permis-
sible offset determined from the demands. In practice, β is
set no larger than 1 to ensure that the cost does not exceed
the keyword bidding cost, i.e., the virtual budget. Meanwhile
α is constrained in ranges determined from advertiser’s tol-
erable ranges of [l,u].
CIA generates fine-grained impression-level bids with
coarse-grained AD-level α and tk for implicit ROI con-
straints. Note that in basic CIA, αi ≤ 1 is used to guarantee
a higher ROI while such constraint on αi is eliminated but
replaced with the ROI range implied by [li, ui] in the GMV
optimization. To solve the problem, we first utilize the bid
ranges [l,u] to derive a feasible range of each αi. For this
purpose, firstly li and ui are replayed as keyword-level bids
to obtain the corresponding cost range of the i-th AD. This
is reasonable since the cost is monotonically non-increasing
with the bids. Then the replay module is inversely applied to
approximate the feasible range of αi from cost.
Assume there is a set of k effective αi, denoted as
{αi1, ..., αik}
4. For each AD, αij(j = 1, ..., k) is eval-
4For the ease of presentation, we assume that k is the same
uated by the replay module to yield a valuation point
(αij , yij , zij). z˜i is obtained by replaying with keyword-
level bids. Following the discretization, the GMV optimiza-
tion problem can be reformulated as follows:
max
{xij}
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
xijyij
s.t.
k∑
j=1
xij = 1, xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = 1, ..., n,
(β − ǫ)
n∑
i=1
z˜i ≤
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
xijzij ≤ (β + ǫ)
n∑
i=1
z˜i
(9)
where xij is an indicator variable that xij = 1 means
αij is selected for the i-th AD. The above formula-
tion belongs to a classic dynamic programming prob-
lem and can be solved with group Knapsack algorithm
(Salkin and De Kluyver 1975). After obtaining the optimal
{xij}, optimalα can be retrieved accordingly.
Style comparison For an FMCG store, the launching of
new clothing styles now and then is common practice. To re-
duce the marketing risk of awful designs, advertisers need to
be aware of the market response to different styles quickly to
adjust future production and inventory. Within CIA, differ-
ent fashion styles should consume nearly equal impressions
to compare their post-impression performance in a quantifi-
able way. Advertisers only need to put the n tested styles in
the same campaign and let CIA take over. Given a compara-
ble budget with keyword bidding, CIA solves the following
optimization problem to allocate impressions to each style
among all ADs. In practice k could be varied due to bid settings of
different ADs.
as uniform as possible.
max
α
− ||s−
1T s
n
1||2
s.t. (β − ǫ)1T z˜ ≤ 1T z ≤ (β + ǫ)1T z˜,
β ∈ (0, 1], ǫ ∈ [0, β),
(10)
where β and ǫ have the same meaning as in GMV optimiza-
tion and the new variable s denotes the amount of impres-
sions in all the ADs.
This problem can also be solved by group Knapsack al-
gorithm following the same logic with GMV optimization.
However, for the quadratic form of the objective, the opti-
mal solution would yield uniform impressions among ADs.
Based on this, we first calculate the feasible cost range as
[b, B]. Then li and ui are replayed to obtain a feasible range
of αi and also [bi, Bi]. Following the notations, the style
comparison problem can be reformulated as:
max
α
− ||s −
1T s
n
1||2
s.t. bi ≤ zi ≤ Bi, ∀i = 1, ..., n,
b ≤ 1T z ≤ B.
(11)
The above formulation is a standard quadratic program-
ming problem and can be solved with mature solvers such as
OSQP (Stellato et al. 2017). After obtaining the optimal s,
the replay module combined with the binary search method
is utilized to get the optimal α. Compared with Knapsack
algorithms, directly optimizing with quadratic programming
provides a numeric solution without manual discretization.
4 Ranking with CIA
Within keyword bidding, there exists an obvious mismatch:
platform tries to optimize ctr for revenue while adver-
tisers care more about cvr. Meanwhile, consumer experi-
ence depending on conversions (consistent with advertis-
ers) is also ignored. To mitigate the mismatch, industrial
practice often introduces all kinds of relevant factors into
the ranking formula (such as audience/advertiser experi-
ence) (Zhu et al. 2017) or implements a multi-stage ranking
with different criteria (Liu et al. 2017) to balance advertis-
ers’ profits. Nevertheless, all these strategies bring damage
to the classic auction mechanism, affecting its interpretation
and the platform’s revenue.
Given the new bidding formula, the ranking score in CIA
has the following form:
r = bid∗ ctr = α∗ tk ∗ cvr ∗ ip∗ ctr = α∗ tk ∗gmv. (12)
Compared with the original ranking score, CIA takes explic-
itly cvr into bids while the ranking formula is preserved.
In essence, budget savings from low-quality impressions are
spent on higher-valued impressions, leading to a higher ROI.
Therefore, the advertiser’s GMV increases together with
platform revenue and audience experience.
We argue that the CIA bidding keeps the GSP auction
mechanism unchanged, i.e., the allocation and charging
mechanisms have remained the same. Advertisers can still
change their keyword-level bid settings to influence tk so
that the auction game still continues. For multi-agent behav-
ior, the CIA bidding only takes individual tk and impression
value into account, therefore bypasses the difficulty of mod-
eling the competition’s uncertainty to a great extent. How-
ever, compared with keyword-level bidding, CIA bids on an
impression-level and bases its decision on conversion value
(which is typically unavailable for advertisers), thus helping
alleviate advertisers’ irrationality and might shorten the time
to reach Nash equilibrium in the repeated auction game. In
this sense, the market is more efficient.
5 Replay based CIA implementation
To support optimization in the CIA framework, we need to
predict the performance of different α on an AD. Particu-
larly, we are interested in the following two functions:
f(α,AD, E) : daily cost of an AD if bidding based on α,
g(α,AD, E) : daily GMV of an AD if bidding based on α,
where E represents the external bidding environment. For
the baseline cost, we have:
h(KB,AD, E) : daily cost of an AD with keyword bidding.
A historical auction log contains the contextual infor-
mation of all the candidate ADs, bids, predicted ctr, cvr
and commodity price etc. An asynchronous data collection
system based on MaxCompute (Alibabacloud 2018) is de-
signed to tackle the huge-volume streaming queries. For the
replay-based prediction to be usable, the auction distribution
of each AD should be relatively stationary. To justify the as-
sumption, we chose four typical ADs to plot their daily auc-
tion statistics from Jan. 25, 2018 to Jan. 31, 2018 in Fig. 3.
Furthermore, the corresponding cumulative CTR and CVR
distributions are displayed in Fig. 4, which shows that CTR
and CVR distributions are nearly the same for all the test
ADs across the week. The two results together justify that
the replay module is reliable enough to predict performance
based on historical auction records.
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Figure 3: Auction volumes of four ADs across a week,
where the length of the rectangular displays the mean and
the line shows the standard deviation (A-Home Fabric, B-
Cosmetics, C-Female Clothing, D-Office Furniture).
With the historical daily auction log, the replay works as:
1. Updating the bids with α, and re-ranking all the ADs in
the current auction according to eCPM;
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Figure 4: CTR and CVR distributions of four ADs’ auctions across a week. The line represents the mean while the shadow
represents the standard deviation.
2. For the top-N ADs 5, calculating their cost c once clicked;
3. Accumulating ctr ∗ c and ctr ∗ cvr ∗ ip to the cost and
GMV, respectively.
Keyword-level bid settings can also yield rough perfor-
mance following the same procedure. Reversely, in the opti-
mization process, a mapping from the AD’s daily cost to α
would also be necessary. The inverse estimation of α can be
solved efficiently via binary search due to monotonicity.
As a black box module, replay encapsulates the func-
tions of winning probability/bid landscape estimation and
bidding optimization together (see Fig. 2). Currently, it can
generate a pair of (α, cost/GMV ) in milliseconds. To al-
leviate the influence of marketing shifts, CIA can average
performance from the auction log of the past several days.
Other parameterized representations can also fit the map-
pings (see (Ren et al. 2017) and references therein). How-
ever, we choose to replay for its time efficiency and validated
accuracy in engineering practice.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first introduce our experimental settings
including baseline algorithms and evaluation metrics. Then
we report some offline simulation and online A/B test results
with further analysis and discussions.
6.1 Experimental settings
To test the performance of the CIA framework, we decom-
pose evaluations into three levels, i.e., AD level, campaign
level and platform level.
The AD level evaluation bids as equation (7) (abbreviated
as CIA-AD) and is compared with keyword-level bids. The
evaluation of CIA-AD is only used to illustrate the effec-
tiveness of CIA over keyword-level bids. For the AD-level
evaluation, we compare the performance of GMV, ROI,
CVR, and PPC. Formally, CIA-AD is evaluated with the
following baseline with approximately the same advertising
cost (β = 1, ǫ = 0.1):
KB: Standard keyword-level bid settings are used to bid
each impression.
5
N is the number of ad slots for a query.
Campaign level experiments constitute the core evalua-
tions. We test the GMV optimization (CIA-CAMP1) and
style comparison (CIA-CAMP2) performance in Section
3.2. The following baselines are used (β = 1, ǫ = 0.2):
CoKB: For campaign GMV optimization, joint opti-
mization of budget allocation and keyword-level bids is
implemented (Zhang et al. 2012), to compare with CIA-
CAMP1.
KB-CAMP: For style comparison, advertisers set the
same keyword bids on different ADs to compare their
performance, which serves as the baseline of CIA-CAMP2.
The normalized standard deviation of cost spent on different
ADs in CIA-CAMP2 is compared.
The platform level experiments mainly focus on evalu-
ating the effects on the platform when massive advertisers
switch to CIA bidding. Specifically, advertiser GMV/ROI
and platform revenue are evaluated simultaneously.
To make the results more persuasive, all the exper-
iments are carried out on massive randomly selected
ADs/campaigns across two weeks. For the sake of commer-
cial privacy, all performance measures are presented in the
form of a relative shifting ratio compared with the baseline.
6.2 Offline simulation
The offline simulation operates on historical auction logs
and relies on replay for optimization and evaluation.
AD-level: We randomly choose 133, 743 ADs and test
their performance with CIA-AD. The overall average per-
formance and four examples are shown in Tab. 2
Table 2: Offline CIA-AD performancewith KB as a baseline
Measures (%) cost GMV ROI CVR PPC
Overall −0.10 9.69 9.86 10.90 1.80
AD-A 0.90 6.00 5.10 6.20 1.00
AD-B -0.09 9.54 9.64 6.03 4.66
AD-C 0.51 18.84 18.24 23.27 4.25
AD-D 0.53 6.74 6.18 6.55 0.35
From Tab. 2 we can see that with an approximately equal
cost, the GMV and ROI of CIA-AD has an increase of nearly
10 percent. Meanwhile, CVR obtains the maximum increase
of 10.9 percent, which means that more impressions with
high conversion rates are acquired by CIA bidding. This co-
incides with our analysis as the bidding equation takes cvr
into account. It can also be seen that with more cost, AD-
A, C, and D even see an ROI elevation, which means that
platform revenue also grows with advertisers’ ROIs.
Campaign-level: For a campaign-level offline simula-
tion, the results of randomly selected 2599 campaigns which
opt in CIA are shown in Tab. 3. It shows that with a nearly
equal cost, CIA leads to an increase of GMV/ROI by 13 per-
cent, which is reasonable since CoKB still bids on the key-
word level although co-optimized. Meanwhile, CIA bids to-
wards high-valued impressions in the most fine-grainedway.
The increase in CVR also validates the analysis.
Table 3: Offline CIA-CAMP1 performance with CoKB bid-
ding as a baseline
Measures (%) cost GMV ROI CVR PPC
Overall 1.18 14.64 13.62 17.10 3.80
CAMP-A -0.25 15.70 15.99 28.41 11.22
CAMP-B 0.24 14.48 14.21 22.34 8.63
CAMP-C -0.87 6.41 7.34 18.02 12.07
CAMP-D 2.25 25.00 22.25 32.45 8.35
For the style comparison demand, the performance of
CIA-CAMP2 with 17334 campaigns is listed below in Tab.
4. Compared with naive equal keyword bids for style com-
parison, CIA-CAMP2 arrives a more uniform impression al-
location, leading to a fair style comparison.
Table 4: Normalized standard deviations of offline style
comparison performance
Strategies CIA-CAMP2 KB-CAMP
Overall 0.660 0.790
CAMP-A 0.520 0.799
CAMP-B 0.852 0.951
CAMP-C 0.181 0.269
CAMP-D 1.562 1.687
Platform level: Multiple advertisers to opt in CIA will
definitely change the global bidding environment, bringing
complex consequences. To further evaluate the effects, we
conduct an offline performance test by randomly switching a
proportion of all the ADs to bid with CIA. The results of the
whole platform (including all ADs) are displayed in in Tab.
5. It shows that with more and more advertisers changing to
Table 5: Offline platform performance with KB bidding as a
baseline
Measures (%) cost GMV ROI CVR PPC
10 0.25 0.58 0.33 0.72 0.43
30 0.58 3.42 2.82 2.31 1.00
50 0.76 4.79 4.00 3.99 1.33
100 1.41 9.08 7.5 8.18 1.63
CIA, the platform revenue (reflected by advertisers’ costs)
and advertiser ROI grows together, which means that CIA
has a positive effect on a healthy marketing ecosystem.
6.3 Online experiments
The online experiments compare different strategies by ran-
domly allocating online queries to buckets implementing
different strategies.
AD-level: We apply the replay module on the histori-
cal log to estimate a proper α to balance the cost. Then it
is used online to evaluate the performance of CIA-AD as
displayed in Tab.6, where“overall” summarizes the whole
213, 510 ADs and A,B,C,D are the same with those in of-
fline evaluations. With a 2 percent increase in cost, overall
Table 6: Online CIA-AD performancewith KB as a baseline
Measures (%) cost GMV ROI CVR PPC
Overall 2.00 11.60 9.50 11.90 2.30
AD-A -0.20 1.60 1.80 3.10 2.90
AD-B 8.80 12.80 19.10 2.07 -12.90
AD-C 7.90 25.30 16.10 41.40 1.70
AD-D 6.20 23.60 16.40 23.00 7.00
GMV and ROI encounters an increase of 11.6 and 9.5 per-
cent, respectively. The PPC also sees an increase of 7.0 per-
cent, which means that platform efficiency also increases.
Campaign-level: Online evaluation results of CIA-
CAMP1 and CIA-CAMP2 with the same set of offline cam-
paigns are listed in Tab. 7 and Tab .8, respectively. The fun-
damental increase of GMV, ROI, CVR and decrease of PPC
follows the right logic. We can also see that in online ex-
periments, different campaigns have various heterogeneous
performances. This might be caused by the complex envi-
ronmental shift due to bidding changes. Moreover, we con-
clude that offline simulation results are also accurate com-
pared with the online version, which validates that our re-
play system is also reliable.
Table 7: Online CIA-CAMP1 performance with CoKB bid-
ding as a baseline
Measures (%) cost GMV ROI CVR PPC
Overall 0.01 12.50 11.50 3.70 −6.29
CAMP-A 3.18 28.67 24.68 17.47 4.66
CAMP-B -1.58 43.99 46.32 4.35 -7.07
CAMP-C -9.02 -10.61 -1.73 8.83 -1.71
CAMP-D 6.91 20.37 12.59 12.56 -4.73
Table 8: Normalized standard deviations of online style
comparison performance
Strategies CIA-CAMP2 KB-CAMP
Overall 0.524 0.574
CAMP-A 0.670 1.180
CAMP-B 0.621 0.970
CAMP-C 0.498 0.732
CAMP-D 0.092 0.587
Platform level: A large-scale online experiment with
25% ADs changing to CIA bidding is conducted. The over-
all ROI of the ADs with CIA bidding sees an 12.1 increase
with a 4.2 increase in cost, showing that advertiser ROI and
platform revenue grow together. For all the ADs, the average
increase ratio is smaller due to the performance of non-CIA
bidding ADs. In sum, although our derivation of CIA lies in
the perspective of the advertiser, the result shows that CIA-
induced ranking has a positive influence on both advertisers
and platform.
Table 9: Online performance with KB as a baseline (25%
ADs switch to CIA-AD)
Measures (%) cost ROI PPC CTR
CIA ADs 4.2 12.1 1.8 1.4
All ADs 1.3 3.2 0.8 0.5
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a unified advertiser demands
optimization framework called CIA in the e-commerce
sponsored search. CIA formulates formally various de-
mands with budget and unit conversion cost constraints. To
maintain the advertiser knob on ROI, CIA constructs an
impression-level bidding equation with tk, which bridges
the advertiser’s keyword-level bids and the accepted ROI.
Furthermore, to optimize campaign-level demands, CIA in-
troduces an additional cost regulator to adjust AD-level tk
and derives the constraint of virtual budget from the histor-
ical log. We find that under the GSP mechanism, CIA bal-
ances the benefits of three parties in sponsored search to-
gether, leading to a healthy marketing ecosystem. We illus-
trate the CIA optimization framework with two most rep-
resentative demands as campaign-level GMV optimization
and style comparison. A replay system is implemented to
solve the optimization with knapsack algorithm or quadratic
programming. Offline and online experimental results show
that CIA provides a useful bidding strategy and is also qual-
ified as an optimization framework for various demands.
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